We study a resource allocation problem for an early-stage, resource-constrained non-profit organization (NPO) that implements social development projects for public good. The NPO uses a novel approach, which we term as the "ex-post funding" approach, to raise money from donors to fund these projects. In this approach, the NPO uses its initial funds to implement early phases of the project, and then securitizes the results from the completed phases using "result-certificates". It then invites donors to purchase these certificates. The donations thus raised are used to recover the original funds and implement future phases of the project. The implementation of this approach is complicated when the projects must incur a large fixed cost before any benefits are delivered by the project, and the total benefit delivered is time sensitive. We show that there exists an optimal allocation of the initial funds between the fixed cost and implementation stages. We also analyze how the optimal allocation is affected by donor, project, and NPO characteristics.
Introduction
Most non-profit organizations (NPOs) raise funds for operations through donations from various entities and use these funds to achieve social goals, where the social goals typically involve the provision of a public good that simultaneously benefits many individuals. Donors who contribute to the NPO's cause include government agencies, philanthropic institutions, and individual donors.
By far, the single largest source of contributions for such charity are individual donors [Vesterlund, 2006] . In this paper, we focus our attention on the operations of an early-stage, resource-constrained , Indian School of Business
NPO
1 that primarily relies on individual donor contributions to fund its operations.
The availability of donor contributions, which the NPOs depend heavily on, is highly uncertain.
In a traditional setting, NPOs manage the impact of this uncertainty by raising funds for projects prior to implementing them. However, due to lack of adequate information on how effective and efficient the NPO is, donors are usually unsure about donating to the NPO's cause [The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation and McKinsey & Company, 2008] . To address this problem, the non-profit market has seen the emergence of intermediaries, such as Charity Navigator 2 and Give India 3 , which act as rating agencies (exchanges) for NPOs that receive funds from individual donors and connect NPOs with donors [Brown and Kalegaonkar, 2002, The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation and McKinsey & Company, 2008] . Typically, these exchanges focus on rating the NPO's efficiency in using funds, accountability and transparency, and financial sustainability.
In a relatively new and emerging approach, which we term as the "ex-post funding" approach, some NPOs use their initial funds, even if it is insufficient to meet the total cost of the project, to implement early phases of the project. The results from, and costs incurred for, these finished phases are documented and "result-certificates" are issued against these results. Having securitized the output as result-certificates, the NPO then invites donors to purchase these results. Such an approach makes the NPO's operations more transparent to the donors and allows the donors to evaluate the quality of the NPO as well as the output of the given project. The funds raised from selling the result-certificates are used to recover the original funds and implement future phases of the project. For example, United Care Development Services (UCDS) 4 , a NPO based in India, uses a "ex-post funding" approach to raise contributions from donors. Other examples include Splash 5 , a NPO that aims to provide clean drinking water for children, that maintains a monitoring and evaluation platform called "Proving It 6 " where donors can track the progress of each project before , Indian School of Business when compared to securing full funding a priori. We use the total benefit delivered (output from the project) as the basis of comparison and further assume that the NPO's utility is also aligned with maximizing the total output from the project. In our setting, a project is characterized by its fixed cost, number of phases in the implementation phase, per phase implementation cost and benefit, and the discount factor. The NPO is characterized by its initial funds available to implement the ex-post funding approach. As stated earlier, our focus in this paper is on understanding the operational decisions that the NPO needs to make when using an ex-post funding approach.
Consequently, we abstract from the donor behavior details and model the donation process using aggregate probabilities of raising funds during the different stages of the project. Using this framework, we find that there exists an optimal allocation of funds between the two stages, especially for a severely constrained NPO which does not have enough funds even to cover the fixed costs of the project. We also find that the NPO requires relatively modest funds (compared to the total cost of the project) to deliver a substantial fraction of the maximum possible benefit; i.e., even with little initial funds, the NPO can deliver most of the benefit that it could have delivered if it had the entire funding required to implement the project.
The interactions between the donors, NPOs, and beneficiaries in the NPO-value-chain are varied and the challenges faced by NPOs in their operations are numerous. This paper focuses on one particular operational issue, namely the use of initial funds, that can help improve the effectiveness of NPO operations and adds to the growing literature in the area of non-profit operations management. Although we focus our attention on the operations of an early-stage, resource constrained NPO that primarily relies on donor contributions to fund its operations, the insights hold in any general project management setting involving similar uncertainty. In this regard, our results can be potentially generalized to a for-profit project management setting with objectives and constraints similar to those of typical non-profit projects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §2, we position our work in relation to the extant literature. We then discuss our modeling framework and the analysis of the ex-post funding approach in §3. Results of our numerical studies to understand how various parameters affect the Devalkar, Sohoni, and Arora: Optimally allocating initial funds for a resource-constrained NPO. , Indian School of Business 5 optimal allocation decision and performance of the ex-post funding approach are presented in §4. We discuss the implications of our results and future research directions in §5. Appendix A contains the proofs for all our results and we discuss a generalization of the ex-post funding model in Appendix B.
Literature Review
Our paper broadly touches four streams of literature. The first stream is related to project management focused on stochastic resource-constrained project scheduling. There is vast literature in the project management stream that focuses on the impact of resource constraints and uncertainty on the project completion time [Brucker et al., 1999 , Kolisch et al., 1995 . Herroelen and Leus [2005] review the fundamental approaches for scheduling under uncertainty: reactive, robust (proactive), fuzzy and stochastic. Terwiesch and Loch [1999] build on the analytical work of Krishnan et al.
[1997] to study the effect on project completion time of overlapping project activities in the global electronics industry. We build on this existing literature to study the impact of uncertainty in availability of funds on the project completion time. As our paper focuses on the social development projects, the project completion time affects the total benefit delivered by a NPO. Also, unlike uncertainty models studied in existing literature [for example, Terwiesch et al., 2002] , the uncertainty in fundraising faced by a NPO is exogenous in nature (due to its dependence on donors).
By following optimal allocation of the initial funds between the fixed cost phase and the implementation phase, the ex-post funding approach effectively decouples the uncertainty in resource availability from the project schedule. The NPO can use the reserved resources for implementing those phases for which the funds raised through donations may be insufficient.
The second stream is related to social enterprises, which largely comprises of literature classifying the various not-profit models seen in practice and discusses the opportunities and challenges associated with these enterprises [for example, Uvin et al., 2000 , Borzaga and Defourny, 2001 , Sriram, 2011 , Peredo and McLean, 2006 . Our paper focuses on a specific challenge faced by NPOs, namely that of maximizing social benefit, when using the ex-post funding approach and uses a giving behavior and discusses theoretical, empirical and experimental studies that have been used to understand donor motivations for giving. Our focus in the current paper is on operational decisions that a NPO needs to make while implementing development projects and using a specific fund raising strategy, and not so much on designing the fund raising strategy itself. As a result,
we model the arrival of funds to the NPO as an exogenous process. Our modeling assumptions about the donation process and how the NPO undertakes fund raising drives are consistent with observed empirical and experimental evidence.
The third stream is related to the emerging non-profit, humanitarian-operations literature in Operations Management. In this stream De Véricourt and Lobo [2009] look at resource management for a non-profit firm that engages in both for-profit and mission (non-profit) activities, where revenues generated from the for-profit activities are used to subsidize the mission activities. When the ultimate objective for the firm is maximizing social impact, they model the trade-off between achieving social impact in the current period versus generating additional financial resources for social impact in the future. They find that optimal resource allocation has a threshold policy wherein the firm should undertake mission activities only when the available financial resources are above a threshold. While we consider a resource allocation problem in our paper as well, the trade-off in our paper is different. In contrast to De Véricourt and Lobo [2009] , we consider an NPO that undertakes only mission (non-profit) activities and relies on external donations for pursuing these activities, and the trade-off is between delaying the start of implementation and making the implementation stage less dependent on the external, uncertain flow of donations. In that sense, our paper is closer to Natarajan and Swaminathan [2012] , who consider the impact of funding patterns Devalkar, Sohoni, and Arora: Optimally allocating initial funds for a resource-constrained NPO. , Indian School of Business 7 on the management of a humanitarian supply-chain distributing nutritional products. They use a multi-period stochastic inventory model with financial constraints to study the effect of amount, schedule, and uncertainty of funding on the performance of the system. They find that a stateindependent base stock policy is optimal. Their numerical experiments show that receiving early funding is better and under-funded systems that receive funds in a timely manner might be better than systems with delayed full funding. Our focus in the current paper is also on understanding how uncertainty in the availability of funds affects the social impact from a development project.
The ex-post funding approach used by the NPO in our model has similarities with NPO audit contracts studied by Privett and Erhun [2011] . Privett and Erhun take the approach that funding methods are essentially contracts where the donor is exchanging money for social benefits, with the NPO organization acting as a seller of the social benefit. They argue that the model wherein donors allocate funds after scrutinizing financial statements and public reporting by NPOs is inefficient because these reports are unreliable. They propose and develop audit contracts that allow the donor an option to audit the non-profit organization for efficiencies and impose a penalty if there is a discrepancy between reported and actual efficiencies. Our paper complements Privett and Erhun [2011] in the sense that, in the ex-post funding approach, the donors can, if they choose, verify the authenticity of the results-certificates put up for sale by the NPO, and this approach therefore is a form of audit contract between the NPO and donor.
Finally, the fourth stream of literature focuses on the interaction between finance and operations in the for-profit business sector [Buzacott and Zhang, 2004, Chao et al., 2008] . In these models the firm has limited cash resources and its ability to raise money depends on its inventory levels. Instead of explicitly considering a budget constraint, Buzacott and Zhang [2004] model available cash in each period as a function of the firm's assets and liabilities that are updated periodically through production. Chao et al. [2008] consider a dynamic, periodic-review, inventory control problem of a self-financing retailer with lost sales. They characterize the optimal policy and develop an algorithm to compute the inventory levels in a given period. Dada and Hu [2008] consider the problem of a cash-constrained newsvendor when demand is uncertain, i.e., a liquidity-constrained nascent firm.
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In their setting the bank (lender) is the Stackelberg leader, deciding on interest rate to charge, and the newsvendor is the follower deciding on its procurement. The ex-post funding approach studied in this paper has similarities with the self-financing approach in that the implementation of future phases depends on the funds raised from previously completed phases, and the total benefit delivered is a function of the initial funds available with the NPO. The uncertainty in our model arises from the stochastic flow of donations in the non-profit sector.
Model and Analysis
We consider a NPO that implements development projects with the objective of providing a public good to a beneficiary population. The NPO is resource constrained along multiple dimensions. The primary constraint we focus on is limited financial resources wherein the initial funds available with the NPO, R > 0, are less than the total cost of implementing a project. Consequently, the NPO needs to raise funds, in the form of contributions from donors, to successfully complete the project.
Other non-financial resource constraints, such as NPO effort, availability of labor resources, and technical know-how, are a key input in delivering the project output. In the context of our model, we assume these constraints are such that the NPO can implement at most one project at a time.
We model the NPO's output as a threshold public good [Bagnoli and McKee, 1991, Andreoni, 1998 ], which involves fixed and variable operating costs. Specifically, the NPO needs to incur an initial fixed cost, F > 0, before the project can start delivering benefits to the target population.
Beyond the fixed costs, the NPO also incurs on-going operating costs to deliver benefit to the beneficiaries. We call these two stages of the project as the fixed cost and implementation stages, respectively. The implementation stage consists of multiple phases, with M > 0 denoting the total number of phases required to complete the project. We normalize the operating cost for implementing each phase to 1 unit. As discussed in §1, implementing the project in multiple phases allows the NPO to seek repeated contributions for small amounts, allowing the NPO to raise larger total contributions. Operationally, it allows the NPO to continue implementing the project even when partial funds are available. We follow Privett and Erhun [2011] , and model the NPO output (benefit delivered in each phase) as a scalar measure. While this representation is of course a simplification, it is nevertheless useful to illustrate the key trade-offs faced by the NPO while making the funds allocation decision. Further, we also assume throughout the paper that the NPO's objective is aligned with those of the beneficiaries of the project; i.e., the NPO maximizes the total output (or, benefit) delivered by the project. The output delivered by each completed phase is denoted by u, with u > 0. For ease of exposition, we assume u is the same for each phase. There is a time value associated with the benefit, i.e., it is better for the beneficiaries if the project is implemented sooner than later, and we use δ, with 0 < δ ≤ 1 to denote the discount factor per period. Because the NPO must wait for the necessary funds to become available before it can continue with the implementation of the project, the financial resource constraints have an impact on the total number of periods required to complete the project and thereby the actual discounted benefit delivered by the project. Next, we look at how the allocation affects the duration of the two stages of the project, and its impact on the total benefit delivered.
Fixed cost stage
The NPO must first raise funds required to meet the fixed costs which are incurred even before the various phases of the project that actually deliver benefit are implemented. Let k 0 ≤ R denote the funds reserved by the NPO towards operating costs in the implementation phase, and θ ≥ 0 denote the total funds that need to be raised from donors towards meeting the fixed costs. We
To raise funds to cover the fixed costs, the NPO undertakes fund raising drives in each period, till the amount θ is recovered. The total amount of funds raised in a given period t is a random variable denoted by X t . To represent the fact that raising larger amounts in any given period is less probable than raising smaller amounts, we model the probability distribution of X t as a geometric distribution with parameter p, where 0 < p < 1.
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Let τ F (θ) denote the number of periods required to raise θ amount of funds; i.e., τ
for θ > 0, and τ F (0) = 0. The time taken to raise the funds towards fixed costs, τ F (θ), affects the total utility delivered because of discounting. The distribution of τ F (θ), and consequently the expected discount factor over the period required to raise the funds, depends on the actual funds that need to be raised, θ.
Theorem 1 characterizes the functional form ofδ(θ).
When the NPO uses part of its initial funds to cover the fixed costs, the amount it needs to raise from donors in the fixed cost stage is lower. As a result, it takes a stochastically smaller time to raise the fixed costs, begin implementation of the project, and deliver benefits faster. However, not reserving sufficient endowment for the implementation stage makes the NPO dependent on funds raised from the donors during the implementation phase, and can lead to stochastically larger times to finish implementing all the M phases of the project. Thus, when R < F + M , the NPO needs to evaluate the tradeoff in time required for the two stages of the project when choosing k 0 . Next, we consider the implementation stage of the project to understand how the expected benefit delivered during implementation varies with k 0 , the funds reserved for implementation.
Implementation stage
After sufficient funds are available to meet the fixed costs, the NPO uses the endowment allocated for implementation, k 0 , to implement the project in phases and deliver utility to the beneficiaries.
Upon completion of each phase, the NPO "sells" the results from the completed phase to donors Devalkar, Sohoni, and Arora: Optimally allocating initial funds for a resource-constrained NPO. , Indian School of Business 11 to raise funds for future phases. Because the NPO relies on selling results from completed phases to raise funds, the NPO must retain funds for completing at least one implementation phase; i.e., k 0 ≥ 1. Further, for this model to be sustainable, the NPO needs to recoup not just the operating expenses but also its initial endowment by selling the results and therefore the contribution from selling results from each phase is greater than 1.
In any given period, the probability that the results from a completed phase that are available for sale will actually get sold is α, with 0 < α ≤ 1. The project is completed when all M phases are implemented. During the implementation phase, the NPO may be unable to continue implementation in intermediate periods because of non-availability of funds; i.e., all the completed phases are yet to be sold to raise new funds to continue the implementation. Thus, the actual discounted benefit delivered over the M phases is dependent on the realization of sales of the result-certificates.
Let (k, m) denote the state of the system at the beginning of any period, where k denotes the number of phases that can be implemented with the funds available on hand and m the number of phases of the project completed. The state transitions can be represented as a Markov process, as shown in Figure 1 . When k = 0 and 0 < m < M , it means there are completed phases whose
State transition diagram during project implementation.
results have not been sold yet. Thus, with probability α, the NPO will sell a phase in the current , Indian School of Business period and have 1 unit of funds at the beginning of the next period, and with probability 1 − α, it will not sell any results and thus have no funds at the beginning of the next period as well (see figure 1(a)). Notice that (0, 0) implies that no endowment is reserved for the implementation phase.
As discussed earlier, the NPO needs to reserve at least k 0 = 1, and thus the state (0, 0) occurs with zero probability. When k > 0 and m < M , the NPO will use the available funds to implement the next phase and thus the number of completed phases increases to m + 1 at the beginning of the next period. After this implementation, the available funds reduces to k − 1. However, with probability α, one of the completed phases (including the one completed in the current period) is sold, and the funds available with the NPO at the beginning of the next period is k − 1 + 1 = k, and with probability 1 − α no completed phase is sold and the funds at the beginning of the next period is equal to k − 1 (see figure 1(b) ). When m = M , all the phases of the project are completed. Thus, the number of completed phases remains the same at the beginning of the next period. Notice that m = M does not necessarily mean that all the completed phases have been sold. However, not selling the results from all phases does not impact the NPO's objective function, the total benefit delivered from the current project (the time taken to sell results from all phases, however, does have an impact on the time required to start the next project).
Let U (k, m) denote the expected discounted benefit that will be delivered from the beginning of the current period till all the M phases are completed, when the state at the beginning of the current period is (k, m). We then have
Theorem 2 . Then, the expected discounted utility to be delivered at the begin-
ning of a period when the funding available is k units and number of phases completed is m is given by
For a given m, as k increases, the NPO can complete more phases of the project without having to depend on the funds from sale of completed phases. Thus, we expect U (k, m) to be non-decreasing in k for a given m. Theorem 3 proves this formally and furthermore, also shows that the marginal benefit of additional funds is non-increasing.
An immediate implication of Theorem 3 is that U (k 0 , 0), is concave in k 0 , the funds allocated for the implementation phase. Thus, additional funds reserved for the implementation phases have diminishing returns and it may not be optimal to reserve the entire endowment for the implementation phase. In §3.3, we show that Theorems 1 and 3 together imply that the total expected utility under the ex-post funding approach is unimodal in k 0 and study the optimal allocation of funds to reserve for the implementation stage.
So far, we implicitly assumed that the NPO can sell at most one unit each period. While this assumption allows us to explain our insights better and simplifies our analytical expressions, this
need not be the case in general. It is plausible that the NPO may have more than one completed units to sell and one or more of these results are sold in the same period. In Theorem B.1, Appendix B, we show that the concavity result holds more generally.
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Allocation of initial funds under ex-post funding
The expected total (discounted) benefit delivered by the project is given by
. From Theorems 1 and 3 we know that
) is non-increasing, whereas U (k 0 , 0) is non-decreasing, in k 0 . Thus, the NPO has to decide on the optimal allocation of funds between the fixed cost and implementation stages; i.e., find the optimal k 0 to maximize the total benefit delivered by the project. Theorem 4 states that there exists a unique optimal allocation of the funds between the two phases. 
wherek is such that
Theorem 4 illustrates that allocating the entire endowment of initial funds to either the fixed cost or implementation stages alone may not always be optimal, and this is particularly true when the NPO has moderate amount of initial funds, compared to the fixed costs of the project (i.e., k < R ≤ F ). In §4, using numerical studies, we study how the optimal allocation is moderated by the different project and donor characteristics.
Numerical Studies
We supplement the analytical results in previous sections with an extensive numerical study to understand the impact of various project, NPO, and donor characteristics on the total benefit delivered. In particular, we seek to understand how different parameters, e.g., discount factor, probability of raising funds, affect a) the optimal allocation of funds across the fixed cost and implementation stages in the ex-post funding approach, and b) the total benefits delivered. The results of our numerical studies answering these questions are presented in §4.2-4.3, after describing the setup for our studies in §4.1.
Numerical study setup
Project characteristics. We consider development projects with multiple phases during implementation. For the results reported here, we set the number of phases M = 15. While we do not report it, the results are qualitatively similar for other values of M . We normalize the cost of implementing each phase to 1 unit, while the benefit delivered from each completed phase, u, is set to 10. From the previous analytical results, it is easy to see that the total expected benefit scales in proportion to u, and therefore the results are invariant to the choice of u. For the fixed cost phase of the project, we vary the total fixed costs F and report results for different values of F .
We also vary the discount factor, δ, associated with the project to understand how the sensitivity of benefits to time affects various decisions and performance.
NPO characteristics. The initial funds available, R, determines the extent to which the NPO is financially constrained and has an impact on the total expected utility delivered under the resultsbased funding model. We vary R between 1 and F + M to understand how the availability of funds, along with other parameters, affects the allocation decision and the total benefit delivered.
Donor characteristics. The donor characteristics are modeled through the probability of raising funds during the different stages of the project. Specifically, we vary p, the probability of raising one unit of funds during the fixed cost phase, and α, the probability of selling a result-certificate.
Allocation of funds
The first part of our numerical study deals with understanding how the various exogenous parameters affect the NPO's optimal funds allocation decision. As more funds are reserved for implementation, it reduces the NPO's dependence on contributions raised through the sale of result certificates to keep the implementation going. However, reserving more funds for implementation means the NPO has to raise a larger amount from donors to cover the fixed costs upfront and this Optimal initial funds allocation: Impact of project and donor characteristics.
As α increases, the NPO can raises funds from the sale of result certificates faster. Therefore, it does not need to reserve a large amount of funds for the implementation phase, as can been seen from Figure 2 . For the same value of α and δ, the expected time to raise the fixed costs decreases as p increases. Thus, the NPO will find it beneficial to reserve more funds for the implementation phase to de-couple the implementation from the exogenous contributions of donors, andk increases as p increases, as can been seen by comparing figure 2(c) with 2(a) for a given α and δ.
While the impact of a change in α and p on the funds allocation decision is intuitive and straight forward, it is not immediately clear as to how a change in the discount factor δ will affect the allocation decision. This is because an increase in δ affects both the fixed cost and implementation stages in the same direction; i.e., an increase in δ reduces the loss in benefit due to an increase in the time to raise fixed costs as well as the loss in benefit due to longer implementation times.
Thus, the optimal allocation decision is affected by which effect dominates. As seen from figure 2, the optimal allocation for the implementation phase increases as δ increases for all values of α, for a given p. This suggests that the benefit of de-coupling the implementation from the fund raising process in the implementation stage is more for higher values of δ, and so it is better for the NPO to allocate more of its initial funds to the implementation phase.
Effectiveness of ex-post funding approach
As seen from the analytical results, using the initial funds to follow a ex-post funding approach has operational benefits in terms of allowing the NPO to partially relax the dependency on external donations to implement the project phases. Clearly, as the total funds available increases, the dependence on external donations for the current project reduces and the NPO can deliver more benefit from the project. A key decision for the NPO is to determine how much initial funds (i.e., corpus/endowment) to raise before starting to implement projects using the ex-post funding approach. To make this decision, it is useful to understand how a NPO with limited funds performs, in terms of total expected benefit delivered, when compared to a NPO which has all the funds required to implement the project. In this section, we consider the effectiveness of the ex-post funding approach compared to full funding.
A NPO with sufficient funds, i.e., R ≥ F + M , can implement the project immediately and deliver a total expected benefit of u ×
, whereas a NPO with R < F + M using a ex-post funding approach delivers a total expected benefit equal toδ( , Indian School of Business
Discussion and Future Research
In this paper we analyze the operations of a resource constrained NPO that implements social development projects and raises funds from donors using a "ex-post funding" approach. First, we show that there exists an optimal allocation of the initial funds between the fixed cost and implementation stages of the project that maximizes the total expected benefit delivered by the project. Using numerical studies, we find that even with a relatively modest funds (compared to the total cost of the project), the NPO can deliver a substantial fraction of the maximum possible net benefit. This paper is amongst the first few that analyze non-profit operations and considers a very specific problem of funds allocation. Below, we discuss a few directions along which the model analyzed in this paper can be extended.
The initial funds decision
Throughout the analysis in this paper, the initial funds available with the NPO was assumed to be exogenously determined. A potential direction in which the analysis can be extended involves endogenizing the decision regarding initial funds. That is, how should the NPO decide on what is the optimal amount of funds to accumulate, before beginning to use the ex-post funding approach?
To build the initial funds, the NPO has to follow a "traditional" model wherein it seeks contributions from donors before any results are available. Another significant difference between raising funds to build an initial fund versus raising funds to cover on-going project costs is in terms of the quantum of funds raised. For meeting project costs, the funds raised (or, required) at each instance are much smaller than what is required for building the initial corpus. As a result, a majority of donors contributing to projects are likely to be individuals or small organizations that are interested in funding a specific project. One can think of these donors as constituting a "individual donor market". In contrast, building a corpus involves raising substantially more funds and it is very likely that large institutional donors / grant giving agencies / very high net worth individuals are more likely to provide the initial funds which can then be used for implementing projects and raising smaller, repeated contributions from the individual donor market. One can think of the donors who are likely to contribute to the initial funds of a NPO as "institutional" donors and Devalkar, Sohoni, and Arora: Optimally allocating initial funds for a resource-constrained NPO. , Indian School of Business 21 model the NPO's decision problem as a two-stage problem where the first stage constitutes the decision on the optimal funds to raise and the second stage involves using these funds to implement
projects. An important part of modeling this two-stage decision problem would be to model the dynamics of donor behavior in the institutional donor market.
Lifetime expected utility
The ex-post funding model was evaluated in terms of the total discounted benefit delivered for a single project. Alternately, the NPO might be interested in the total expected benefit delivered over the long run, across multiple projects, i.e., the lifetime benefit delivered.
Given the resource constrained nature of the NPO, it can only undertake projects sequentially;
i.e., it cannot start the next project until all the activities associated with the previous project are completed. Let τ c denote the time required to complete all M phases of a project, after the fixed costs are covered. Under the ex-post funding approach, it may take the NPO longer to recover the entire funds, beyond the time required to finish implementing the M phases. Let τ r ≥ τ c denote the time required to recover the entire funds used in the implementation of the project. Thus, the expected lifetime benefit delivered is given bȳ
Usingδ to denote E [δ τr ], the next theorem provides a closed form expression for E [δ τr ].
Theorem 5. Under the ex-post funding approach, the expected discount factor from the beginning of the implementation stage till the next project is started, denoted byδ, is given bŷ
It is interesting to note thatδ is independent of k 0 , the funds allocated to the implementation stage. This is a result of the fact that for the NPO to recover the funds, it has to sell M completed phases irrespective of how much funds is allocated to the implementation phase. The expected discount factor over the time period required to sell one completed phase is equal to , Indian School of Business (δα)/(1 − δ(1 − α)), and since the sale of each of the M phases are independent and identically distributed, the expected discount factor over the time to sell all M finished phases is therefore
NPO's utility function
In our analysis, we have assumed that the NPO's utility is perfectly aligned with the benefit delivered to the target beneficiaries of the project, and as a result the NPO is interested in maximizing the total expected benefit delivered. As NPOs cannot disburse any surplus to stakeholders and therefore unlikely to have a profit motive, our modeling of the NPO's objective function is in line with this feature of NPOs. However, it is possible that a NPO might enjoy private benefits from implementing development projects, which do not accrue to the project beneficiaries. For instance, there might be private utility that a NPO enjoys upon completion of a project, or a private cost of exerting effort to implement the project. Our model can be extended to include such private utilities without significant changes, and the essential trade-offs in the funds allocation decision remain unaltered.
Project failures
In our analysis, we have considered the implementation of "proven" projects where the probability of failure to deliver benefits to the target population is minimal. In reality, development projects require the active participation of multiple stakeholders, including the intended beneficiaries themselves. It is likely that sometimes the implementation of a given phase may not yield the intended benefits, and the phase can "fail". We can extend the model in the current paper in different ways, to accommodate project failures. One approach is to model the results from a failed phase as having a lower probability of being sold, and thereby taking a longer time to sell and raise funds to finish the project. Another approach would be to assume that the money used for the failed phase can never be recovered. In such an approach, the effective funds available to the NPO for future projects is stochastically decreasing over time, and unless there is external infusion of funds, the NPO will eventually use up all its funds. Incorporating project failure is non-trivial and is an interesting avenue for future work.
Multiple projects
In a more general setting the NPO may have the ability to work on a portfolio of social-development projects. In such settings the NPO may have the ability to cross subsidize across projects. Additionally, the probability of raising donations may depend on the portfolio of projects undertaken and the number of phases completed successfully. These issues raise interesting questions and provide interesting avenues of future research. 
Proof of Theorem 1:
Considerδ(1). We haveδ
.
Suppose equation (3) is true for 1, . . . , θ. We havē
Therefore, by induction, equation (3) is true for all θ ≥ 1. Further, it is also clear from equation (3) that
is increasing in θ.
Proof of Theorem 2:
We have
By repeated substitution and using the fact that
Finally, notice that
. . .
Proof of Theorem 3:
We prove the theorem by induction. Notice that U (0, 0) = 0 < U (1, 0), and
where the inequality follows from the induction assumption.
To prove the second claim, we can show, after some algebra, that
, where the inequality follows from the induction assumption.
Proof of Theorem 4:
] .
From Theorem 3, we know that U (k 0 , 0) is concave and increasing in k 0 . Therefore, the first term inside the parentheses is non-negative and decreasing in k 0 .
First, consider the case of an extremely constrained NGO; i.e., R ≤ F . Consider T U (R) − T U (R − 1).
From equation (3), we can verify that the second expression in the parenthesis is constant for all F + k 0 − R > 0 and equal to
Thus, for R ≤ F , the optimal allocation for the implementation phase, k * 0 , is equal to min{R,k}.
Because F + k F − R = 0, andδ(θ) = 1 for all θ ≤ 0, the second term in the parenthesis above is 0. Further, 
Proof of Theorem 5:
In the ex-post funding approach, the next project starts when the current project reaches the absorbing state (k 0 , M ). Letδ(k, m) denote the expected discount factor over the time period between when the state of the implementation process is (k, m) and it reaches (k 0 , M ). We havē
Simplifying the first recursion above, we getδ(k, M ) = 
Using the second recursion above, it is easy to verify thatδ
. Substituting, we havē
,
Appendix B: Generalization of ex-post funding model
In §3.2, we had assumed that results from at most one finished phase of the project will be sold in any period.
However, it is very likely that the NPO may have results from multiple finished phases that are unsold at the beginning of a given period, and results from more than one phase may be sold in the same period. That is, if at the beginning of period t, the NPO has j phases which are completed and whose results are not sold yet, then in period t it is possible that results from any i ≤ j of these phases are sold in period t. In this appendix, we consider such a case and show that the expected utility delivered during implementation is increasing and concave in k 0 , the initial funds reserved for the implementation phase.
Consider a situation where at the beginning of the period after the first k 0 phases are implemented, the NPO has k < k 0 units of funds. This implies that there are k 0 − k phases that are unsold. The NPO uses the k units to implement the next k phases. Upon completion of the next k phases, there will be
phases that are available for sale, and so the starting funds is again a random variable which can take values in {0, 1, . . . , k 0 }. As a result, we only need to keep track of n, the number of phases remaining to be completed in the project without having to keep track of how the funds themselves accumulate between periods. To this end, let U (n) denote the expected utility delivered over the remaining n phases. Then, U (0) = 0 and for
where p k is the probability that the funds available with the NPO is equal to k. Notice that the expectation is on the amount of funds available with the NPO at the beginning of the period when there are still n phases left to be completed.
Let the probability of selling a phase be independent and identically distributed for all phases, with 0 < α ≤ 1 being the probability that the results from a completed phase are sold in a given period. Then,
As the next theorem states, the total expected utility is concave and increasing in k 0 , the initial funds reserved for the implementation phase.
Theorem B.1. The total expected utility, U (n), is non-decreasing and concave in k 0 , the initial funds reserved for the implementation phase.
To simplify the exposition, let U (n), V (n) and W (n) denote the expected utility to be delivered when the initial funds for implementation is k 0 , k 0 + 1 and k 0 + 2, respectively, for some k 0 ≥ 1. The above theorem , Indian School of Business then implies that W (n) ≥ V (n) ≥ U (n), and W (n) − V (n) ≤ V (n) − U (n) for all n. In order to prove the above theorem, we need the following lemmas. Let the lemma be true for n − 1, n − 2, . . . , 0 for some n > 0. Consider W (n), when the funds available is k,
Considering W (n), W (n − 1) and W (n − 2) when the funds available is k, k > 0, we have
where the inequality follows from the induction hypothesis.
Thus, the lemma is true for n, for all k > 0. By induction, the theorem is true for all n. The proof for V (·) is identical. Proof. We prove the lemma for the relation with V (·) and U (·), and the proof for W (·) and V (·) is identical.
Similar to lemma B.1, we extend equation (B.1) for n < 0, by setting U (n) = V (n) = W (n) = u × [(1 − δ n )/(1 − δ)] for n ≤ 0. Further, it is easy to verify that the lemma is true for n = 0.
Suppose the lemma is true for n − 1, n − 2, . . . , 0 for some n > 0. Consider U (n), when the funds available with the NPO is equal to k > 0. We have U (n) = u × [(1 − δ k )/(1 − δ)] + δ k U (n − k). When considering V (·), there are k 0 + 1 units that are available for sale. Thus, when k > 0 units of funds are available when considering U , with probability α there are k + 1 units of funds available when considering V , and with probability 1 − α, there are k units of funds available. Thus,
By the induction hypothesis, we have u
and by lemma B.1, u + δV
Further, following the earlier steps, we can show that
Thus, the lemma is true for n, for all k > 0. By induction, the lemma is true for all n. Proof. We prove the lemma for the relation with V (·) and U (·), and the proof for W (·) and V (·) is identical.
Collecting terms, we have
, where the inequality follows from lemma B.2.
Similarly, collecting terms we get
where the second inequality follows from lemma B.3. By the induction assumption, we have V (n − k) − U (n − k) ≥ W (n − k) − V (n − k) for k > 0 and therefore, we have V (n) − U (n) − (W (n) − V (n)) ≥ 0. Thus, by induction the theorem is true for all n and the expected utility is concave in the initial funds reserved for the implementation phase.
